The EU's Complicity in the Gaza War: Why Trump's Plan Must Not Absolve Accountability

The first phase of the Trump administration's Middle East plan has provoked a widespread feeling of reassurance among EU officials. After two years of violence, the truce, hostage releases, partial IDF pullback, and aid delivery offer hope – yet regrettably, create an excuse for Europe to persist with passivity.

The EU's Troubling Position on the Gaza Conflict

Regarding the Gaza conflict, in contrast to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, European governments have revealed their worst colours. Deep divisions exist, causing political gridlock. But worse than inaction is the charge of complicity in violations of international law. EU bodies have refused to exert pressure on the perpetrators while maintaining economic, diplomatic, and defense cooperation.

The breaches of international law have sparked widespread anger among the European public, yet EU governments have lost touch with their own people, especially youth. In 2020, the EU championed the environmental movement, responding to youth demands. Those same youth are now shocked by their government's passivity over Gaza.

Delayed Recognition and Weak Measures

It took two years of a war that many consider a genocide for multiple EU countries including France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg and Malta to recognise the State of Palestine, after Spain, Ireland, Norway and Slovenia's lead from the previous year.

Only recently did the EU executive propose the first timid sanctions toward Israel, including sanctioning extremist ministers and aggressive colonists, plus suspending EU trade preferences. Nevertheless, neither step have been enacted. The first requires unanimous agreement among all member states – unlikely given strong opposition from nations including Hungary and the Czech Republic. The second could pass with a supermajority, but Germany and Italy's opposition have rendered it ineffective.

Contrasting Approaches and Damaged Trust

This summer, the EU found that Israel had violated its human rights obligations under the bilateral trade deal. However, recently, the EU's foreign policy chief paused efforts to revoke the preferential trade terms. The contrast with the EU's multiple rounds of Russian sanctions could not be more stark. On Ukraine, Europe has taken a principled stand for freedom and international law; on Gaza, it has damaged its credibility in the international community.

The US Initiative as an Convenient Excuse

Now, Trump's plan has offered Europe with an escape route. It has enabled EU nations to support Washington's demands, like their stance on Ukraine, security, and commerce. It has permitted them to trumpet a fresh beginning of stability in the region, shifting attention from punitive measures toward European support for the US plan.

The EU has retreated into its comfort zone of taking a secondary role to the US. While Arab and Muslim majority countries are expected to shoulder the burden for an peacekeeping mission in Gaza, European governments are preparing to participate with humanitarian assistance, rebuilding, administrative help, and frontier supervision. Discussion of leveraging Israel has largely vanished.

Practical Obstacles and Geopolitical Constraints

This situation is understandable. The US initiative is the sole existing framework and certainly the only plan with any chance, however small, of achievement. This is not due to the intrinsic value of the proposal, which is flawed at best. It is instead because the United States is the sole actor with sufficient influence over Israel to effect change. Backing American efforts is therefore both practical for Europeans, it is logical too.

However, executing the plan after its first phase is more challenging than anticipated. Multiple hurdles and catch-22s exist. Israel is improbable to completely withdraw from Gaza unless Hamas disarms. But Hamas will not surrender entirely unless Israel departs.

Future Prospects and Required Action

The plan aims to transition toward Palestinian self-government, first involving local experts and then a "restructured" Palestinian Authority. But administrative reform means radically different things to the US, Europeans, Arab countries, and the local population. Israel opposes this entity altogether and, with it, the concept of a independent Palestine.

Israel's leadership has been explicitly clear in restating its unchanged aim – the destruction of Hamas – and has carefully evaded addressing an end to the war. It has not completely adhered to the ceasefire: since it came into effect, dozens of Palestinian civilians have been killed by IDF operations, while additional individuals have been injured by Hamas.

Without the international community, and especially the US and Europe, exert greater pressure on Israel, the likelihood exists that mass violence will restart, and Gaza – as well as the Palestinian territories – will continue being occupied. In short, the outstanding elements of the initiative will not see the light of day.

Conclusion

Therefore European leaders are wrong to consider backing the US initiative and leveraging Israel as separate or opposing. It is politically convenient but practically incorrect to view the first as belonging to the peace process and the latter to one of continuing war. This is not the time for the EU and its constituent countries to feel let off the hook, or to abandon the initial cautious steps toward sanctions and requirements.

Leverage exerted on Israel is the sole method to surmount diplomatic obstacles, and if this is achieved, Europe can ultimately make a modest – but constructive, at least – contribution to peace in the region.